The Myth of A Unified "Moro" Resistance And Its Implication To Peace in Mindanao

There's no doubt that Muslim Mindanao, or "Bangsamoro" as it's popularly called nowadays, needs a better framework than what's currently in place under ARMM to keep lasting peace in Mindanao. But, as rightfully pointed out by Pat Abinales in his "The Moro struggle as myth and as historical reality" article that appeared in the Rappler, the historical narrative that's the basis for the Moro people to desire their own "Bangsamoro" homeland is flawed and, unless that reality is recognized and taken into consideration in any peace plan, will be a major stumbling block to any endeavor to achieve such end in Mindanao. 

Even Thomas McKenna, in his "Muslim rulers and rebels: everyday politics and armed separatism in the southern Philippines" published by University of California Press in 1998, spoke of the myth of a unified "Moro" resistance. The Spaniards wrongly labeled all Muslim natives in Mindanao as "Moros", the word they pejoratively used to describe people of Islamic faith back in their native Spain, as if these natives belong to one ethnic group. In fact, the Tausugs, Maranaos and Maguindanaoans hardly had any widespread interactions among themselves and the resistance they put up against the Spaniards and, later, the Americans were mostly localized and were not seen as defending their "country" against foreign invaders. Their wars with the foreigners were not seen in the context of their Islamic faith but rather from defending their individual sultanates.

The Americans were the first to give these Muslim natives their own sense of "Moro" identity. In late 1930s Moro leaders even expressed to the Americans their desire to stay under the US while their Christian brothers in the north sought independence.

But it was Marcos, who secretly planned to take back militarily Sabah and aggressively interfered in Moro politics, that brought these Moro ethnic groups together to resist the central government. It was Marcos, whose failed Merdeka operation resulted in the disastrous Jabidah massacre of young Moro recruits in the island of Corregidor, that crystallized Moro resistance and started the unified Moro insurgency in Mindanao. In 1969, the MNLF was led by two young idealistic Moros of completely different background: Nur Misuari is a Tausug who was a professor at UP and Hashim Salamat was a Maguindanaoan who completed his Islamic studies in Egypt. The former preferred a more secular Bangsamoro and the latter an Islamic state. The former is strongly supported by Tausugs and, to a lesser extent, the Samals while the latter was popular among the Maguindanaoans and, to a lesser extent, the Maranaos.

This reality makes it difficult to have one encompassing Bangsamoro for all Moro ethnic groups and for any peace plan to truly succeed it should be inclusive of at least both the MNLF and the MILF. Perhaps two separate Moro autonomous regions may be a more practical approach. Whatever approach is chosen, time is of the essence in achieving a lasting peace in Mindanao in view of an external phenomenon sweeping the Islamic regions of the world and would soon become a bigger threat to the country if left unattended: Islamic radicalization as exemplified by ISIS and Al Qaeda. Another issue that complicates matters for Mindanao and that needs to be addressed is the Sabah claim. Misuari's MNLF is now claiming Sabah as part of the Bangsamoro. This could be tactical for Misuari but it definitely brings Malaysia into the equation.

References:

1. "The Moro struggle as myth and as historical reality"  by Patricio Abinales

http://www.rappler.com/thought-leaders/85353-moro-struggle-myth-historical-reality?fb_action_ids=10203869285793255&fb_action_types=og.shares

2. "Muslim rulers and rebels: everyday politics and armed separatism in the southern Philippines" by Thomas McKenna

http://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft0199n64c&chunk.id=d0e1257&toc.depth=1&toc.id=d0e1085&brand=ucpress